Regulatory choice with pollution and innovation
"This paper develops a simple model of a polluting industry and an innovating firm. The polluting industry is faced with regulation and costly abatement. Regulation may be taxes or marketable permits. The innovating firm invests in R&D and develops technologies which reduce the cost of p...
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Format: | UnknownFormat |
Sprache: | eng |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
2010
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Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
16303 |
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Zusammenfassung: | "This paper develops a simple model of a polluting industry and an innovating firm. The polluting industry is faced with regulation and costly abatement. Regulation may be taxes or marketable permits. The innovating firm invests in R&D and develops technologies which reduce the cost of pollution abatement. The innovating firm can patent this innovation and use a licensing fee to generate revenue. In a world of certainty, the first best level of innovation and abatement can be supported by either a pollution tax or a marketable permit. However, the returns to the innovator from innovation are not the same under the two regimes. A marketable permit system allows the innovator to capture all of the gains to innovation; a tax system involves sharing the gains of innovation between the innovator and the polluting industry"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site |
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Beschreibung: | Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen |
Beschreibung: | 14 S. graph. Darst. |