Fixed versus variable supply in the public provision of goods

Using discriminatory price auctions with variable supply, we explore a situation in which a corruptible public employee is in charge of producing and allocating a finite number of goods among consumers with uniformly distributed valuations. The negative effects of corruption are lower when the emplo...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Research in economics
1. Verfasser:	Buia, Raluca Elena (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2009
Schlagworte:	Öffentliche Dienstleistung > Korruption > Theorie > Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Using discriminatory price auctions with variable supply, we explore a situation in which a corruptible public employee is in charge of producing and allocating a finite number of goods among consumers with uniformly distributed valuations. The negative effects of corruption are lower when the employee‘s task is to “provide at least q0 goods” than when the employee is required to “provide exactly q0 goods”.
ISSN:	1090-9443