Insurance markets with differential information
This article attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of an insurance contract simultaneously has superior information. I assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information about general risks. I find that low-general-risk pol...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The journal of risk and insurance |
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2009
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| Schlagworte: | |
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | This article attempts to understand the outcomes when each party of an insurance contract simultaneously has superior information. I assume that policyholders have superior information about specific risks while insurers have superior information about general risks. I find that low-general-risk policyholders purchase insurance, while high-general-risk policyholders are self-insured. Among the low-general-risk policyholders, high-specific-risk policyholders purchase full insurance, while low-specific-risk policyholders purchase partial insurance. When insurers can strategically publicize their information, efficiency is improved because high-general-risk policyholders purchase actuarially fair insurance. The market segmentation is also found based on the general-risk type and the publicizing of information |
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| Beschreibung: | graph. Darst. |
| ISSN: | 0022-4367 |