Banco Nacional: jogo de Ponzi, PROER e FCVS

This paper analyses the causes of the failure of Banco Nacional and the resolution method adopted by the Brazilian central bank. The program (PROER) designed by the central bank and its legal framework allowed the failed bank to buy “defaulted securities”, financed by the central bank, and to use th...

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Veröffentlicht in:Brazilian journal of political economy
1. Verfasser: Barbosa, Fernando de Holanda (VerfasserIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:por
Veröffentlicht: 2008
Schlagworte:
Bankinsolvenz > Zentralbank > Brasilien > Kreditwesen > Notenbank > Finanzwirtschaft > Soziale Kosten > Bank > Wertpapier > Investitionsschutz > Kreditwirtschaft > Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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Zusammenfassung:This paper analyses the causes of the failure of Banco Nacional and the resolution method adopted by the Brazilian central bank. The program (PROER) designed by the central bank and its legal framework allowed the failed bank to buy “defaulted securities”, financed by the central bank, and to use them as borrowing collateral. The paper also analyses the private and social costs of this bank failure. (Rev Econ Polit/GIGA)
Beschreibung:Zsfassung in engl. Sprache
Beschreibung:Tab., Lit. S. 113-115
ISSN:0101-3157