Imitation and the evolution of Walrasian behavior theoretically fragile but behaviorally robust

A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper, we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outco...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Weitere Verfasser: Apesteguia, Jose (BerichterstatterIn), Huck, Steffen (BerichterstatterIn), Oechssler, Joerg (BerichterstatterIn), Weidenholzer, Simon (BerichterstatterIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a. 2008
Schriftenreihe:CESifo working paper series Industrial organisation 2224
Schlagworte:
Evolutionsstabile Strategie
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:A well-known result by Vega-Redondo (1997) implies that in symmetric Cournot oligopoly, imitation leads to the Walrasian outcome where price equals marginal cost. In this paper, we show that this result is not robust to the slightest asymmetry in fixed costs. Instead of obtaining the Walrasian outcome as unique prediction, every outcome where agents choose identical actions will be played some fraction of the time in the long run. We then conduct experiments to check this fragility. We obtain that, contrary to the theoretical prediction, the Walrasian outcome is still a good predictor of behavior.
Beschreibung:Literaturverz. S. 11 - 12
Beschreibung:13 S.
graph. Darst.