Risk shifting versus risk management investment policy in corporate pension plans
The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk shifting and risk management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as go...
Gespeichert in:
1. Verfasser: | |
---|---|
Format: | UnknownFormat |
Sprache: | eng |
Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass.
National Bureau of Economic Research
2007
|
Schriftenreihe: | NBER working paper series
13240 |
Schlagworte: | |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | The asset allocation of defined benefit pension plans is a setting where both risk shifting and risk management incentives are likely be present. Empirically, firms with poorly funded pension plans and weak credit ratings allocate a greater share of pension fund assets to safer securities such as government debt and cash, whereas firms with well-funded pension plans and strong credit ratings invest more heavily in equity. These relations hold both in the cross-section and within firms and plans over time. The incentive to limit costly financial distress plays a considerably larger role than risk shifting in explaining variation in pension fund investment policy among U.S. firms. |
---|---|
Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 36 - 39 Internetausg.: http://papers.nber.org/papers/w13240.pdf - lizenzpflichtig |
Beschreibung: | 60 S. graph. Darst. |