A industrialização da pauta de exportação brasileira entre 1964 e 1974 novos dados e índices para o comércio exterior brasileiro do período

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governme...

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Veröffentlicht in:Brazilian journal of political economy
1. Verfasser: Batista, Jorge Chami (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Santos, Wilson Calmon Almeida dos (BerichterstatterIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:por
Veröffentlicht: 2007
Schlagworte:
Free Trade Area of the Americas > 1964-1974 > Außenhandel mit Industriegütern > Brasilien > Außenhandel > Handelsbilanz > Export > Industrieprodukt > Marktanteil > Terms of Trade > Handelsvertrag > Außenhandelspolitik > Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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Zusammenfassung:The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg “coalition-proof” equilibrium defines t the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economy’s negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case. (Rev Econ Polit/GIGA)
Beschreibung:Zsfassung in engl. Sprache
Beschreibung:graph. Darst.
graph. Darst.
ISSN:0101-3157