Why forcing people to save for retirement may backfire presented at CESifo Conference on Public Sector Economics, May 2004
Literaturverz. S. 37 - 39
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a.
2005
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| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper series Social protection
1458 |
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | Literaturverz. S. 37 - 39 If individuals are unable or unwilling to borrow, a higher than desired second pillar pension capital may induce people to retire earlier than they would have in the absence of such a scheme. Individuals thus leave the workforce as soon as the retirement income is deemed sufficient and the pension plan avails withdrawal of benefits. We provide evidence using individual data from a selection of Swiss pension funds, allowing us to perfectly control for pension scheme details. Our findings suggest that affordability is a key determinant in the retirement decisions. The higher the accumulated pension capital, the earlier individuals tend to leave the workforce. |
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| Beschreibung: | 39 S graph. Darst., Tab |