Long-run selection and the work ethic
That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can su...
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a.
2004
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| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper series Empirical and theoretical methods
1319 |
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run. |
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| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 28 - 30 Internetausg.: http://www.cesifo.de/~DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1319.pdf |
| Beschreibung: | 30 S graph. Darst |