Fending off one means fending off all evolutionary stability in submodular games
Literaturverz. S. 12 - 13
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a.
2004
|
| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper series Industrial organisation
1266 |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | Literaturverz. S. 12 - 13 The implications of evolutionarily stable behavior in finite populations have recently been explored for a variety of aggregative games. This note proves an intimate relationship between submodularity and global evolutionary stability of strategies for these games, which -apart from being of independent interest - accounts for a number of results obtained in the recent literature: we show that any evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) of a submodular aggregative game must also be globally stable. I.e. if one mutant cannot successfully invade a population, any number of mutants can even less do so. |
|---|---|
| Beschreibung: | Internetausg.: http://www.cesifo.de/~DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1266.pdf |
| Beschreibung: | 16 S |