Scholarships or student loans? Subsidizing higher education in the presence of moral hazard

Literaturverz. S. 22 - 23

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser:	Cigno, Alessandro (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Luporini, Annalisa (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a. 2003
Schriftenreihe:	CESifo working paper series Public finance 973
Schlagworte:	Studienfinanzierung > Öffentliches Kreditprogramm > Subvention > Studium > Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie > Moral Hazard > Theorie > Arbeitspapier > Graue Literatur
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:	Literaturverz. S. 22 - 23 Student loans, even income-contingent ones, are not optimal. Potential university students with the appropriate characteristics should be offered a scholarship, dependent on both need and merit. The award of the scholarship should be conditional on the choice of university degree, but students with a natural aptitude for studies that do not hold the prospect of a well paid job should not be pushed towards potentially more lucrative ones. The scheme should be financed by a graduate tax that re-distributes from the better paid to the academically more successful.
Beschreibung:	Internetausg.: http://www.cesifo.de/~DocCIDL/cesifo_wp973.pdf
Beschreibung:	23 S