Optimal factor taxation under wage bargaining a dynamic perspective

We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues, and ii) labour markets are subject to a static inefficiency re...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Koskela, Erkki (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Thadden, Leopold von (VerfasserIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a. 2003
Schriftenreihe:CESifo working paper series Public finance 836
Schlagworte:
Optimale Besteuerung > Lohnsteuer > Kapitalertragsteuer > Investition > Dynamisches Gleichgewicht > Verhandlungstheorie des Lohnes > Arbeitsmarkt > Unvollkommener Markt > Theorie > Arbeitspapier > Graue Literatur > Tarifverhandlung
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Zusammenfassung:We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues, and ii) labour markets are subject to a static inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, under broad assumptions the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero-capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets.
Beschreibung:Literaturverz. S. 28 - 31
Internetausg.: http://www.cesifo.de/pls/ifo_app/DocLinkCESifoDl?getDoc=cesifo_wp836.pdf
Beschreibung:32 S