Does the balance of power within a family matter? The case of the retirement equity act

This paper studies within-family decision making regarding investment in income protection for surviving spouses. A change in US pension law (the Retirement Equity Act of 1984) is used as an instrument to derive predictions both from a simple Nash-bargaining model of the household and from the class...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Aura, Saku (VerfasserIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies 2002
Schriftenreihe:CESifo working paper series Social protection 734
Schlagworte:
Altersvorsorge > Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung > Haushaltsökonomik > Familienökonomik > Verhandlungstheorie > Schätzung > USA > Hinterbliebenenversicherung > Arbeitspapier > Graue Literatur
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Zusammenfassung:This paper studies within-family decision making regarding investment in income protection for surviving spouses. A change in US pension law (the Retirement Equity Act of 1984) is used as an instrument to derive predictions both from a simple Nash-bargaining model of the household and from the classical single-utility-function model of the household. This law change gave spouses of married pension-plan participants the right to survivor benefits unless they explicitly waived the right. The predictions of the classical model are rejected in favor of the predictions of the Nash-bargaining model in the data.
Beschreibung:Literaturverz. S. 31 - 33
Internetausg.: ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/734.pdf
Beschreibung:37 S
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