Monetary policy committees individual and collective reputations

This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals have more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effe...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Sibert, Anne C. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies 1999
Schriftenreihe:	CESifo working paper series 226
Schlagworte:	Zentralbank > Geldpolitik > Inflationsbekämpfung > Glaubwürdigkeit > Gruppenentscheidung > Theorie > Arbeitspapier > Graue Literatur
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