Monetary policy committees individual and collective reputations
This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals have more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effe...
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Munich
Univ., Center for Economic Studies
1999
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| Schriftenreihe: | CESifo working paper series
226 |
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | This paper looks at how the reputation of a monetary policy making committee is jointly determined with the reputations of its individual members. I ask whether individuals have more or less incentive to gain a reputation for being tough on inflation when they are part of a group. I examine the effect of increased transparency - in the form of publishing the votes of individual members - on individuals' incentives to appear hard nosed. I look at how other institutional features of central banks affect the policy making bodys̕ incentive to refrain from inflation. |
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| Beschreibung: | Literaturverz. S. 30 - 31 Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://129.187.96.124/CESifo_WP/226.pdf verfügbar |
| Beschreibung: | 31 S graph. Darst |