Kant on freedom and rational agency
"The idea of freedom plays a central role in Kants philosophy. Kant explains that part of the treasure that his critical philosophy bequeath to posterity is that it saves human freedom from the mechanism of nature Bxxiv to Bxxxi. The system of the Critique of Pure Reason revolves around two car...
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, New York
Oxford University Press
2023
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| Schlagworte: |
Kant, Immanuel
> Kant, Immanuel - 1724-1804
> Liberty
> Philosophy
> Free will and determinism
> Intellectual freedom
> Free thought
> Agent (Philosophy)
> Naturalism
> Liberté - Philosophie
> Libre arbitre et déterminisme
> Liberté de pensée
> Libre pensée
> Naturalisme
> naturalism (philosophical movement)
> Liberty - Philosophy
> Freiheit
> Vernunft
> Handlung
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | "The idea of freedom plays a central role in Kants philosophy. Kant explains that part of the treasure that his critical philosophy bequeath to posterity is that it saves human freedom from the mechanism of nature Bxxiv to Bxxxi. The system of the Critique of Pure Reason revolves around two cardinal points: as a system of nature and of freedom the concept of freedom even constitutes the keystone of the entire edifice of a system of pure reason. When we compare Kants account of freedom with his discussion of God and immortality of the soul, we find that he assigns freedom a strongly privileged role whereas God and immortality are matters of faith mere credible, the idea of freedom is the only metaphysical idea of reason that belongs to the matters of fact scribble. According to Manfred Kuehn's seminal biography this difference was also reflected in Kant's personal life he had no personal faith in God and immortality but the conviction that human reason must be free from fetters such as natural incentives, censorship and prejudices was central to the way in which he lived and philosophized. This conviction highlights an important difference between the ways in which the concept of freedom figures in Kant and in contemporary philosophy. What is at stake in the question of whether we are free agents in contemporary philosophy, this issue is typically consigned to specialized subfields such as the philosophy of action or cognate discussions of moral responsibility and punishment. While these topics are relevant to Kant as well, in his philosophy the notion of freedom has much larger ramifications. This is due to the inseparable connection that Kant forges between freedom and rationality. In Kants mature mid 1780s and later view the question of whether we are free beings is tantamount to the question of whether we are autonomous subjects who can determine themselves by rendering and acting in accordance with objective rational judgments that yield genuine cognitive achievements" "Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency provides a novel interpretation and rational reconstruction of Kant's doctrine of freedom. Markus Kohl shows how Kant defends the belief that we are free from foreign (natural and super-natural) causes as a presupposition of all meaningful human activity. While this interpretation focuses on the essential role that freedom of will plays in our moral agency, it also examines how our status as rational cognitive agents hinges on our freedom of thought, and why our aesthetic engagement with beauty requires our freedom of imagination. Kohl thereby gives a compelling sense of Kant's estimation that freedom is a "cardinal point"--even the "keystone"--of his entire critical philosophy. Kant's doctrine of freedom emerges in this account as a systematic critique of a naturalistic worldview which regards all our capacities, representations, and actions as the causal upshot of natural laws and forces. Kant holds that the naturalistic worldview fatally undermines our self-conception as rational agents. This critique of naturalism culminates in the argument that naturalistic cognizers cannot explain away our freedom from natural forces because they must presuppose such a freedom in their own cognitive efforts to devise rationally valid naturalistic theories." -- |
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| Beschreibung: | X, 399 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780198873143 978-0-19-887314-3 |