Informative versus persuasive advertising in a dynamic hotelling monopoly
A dynamic Hotelling monopoly model is proposed, with the purpose of characterising the effects of informative and persuasive advertising in a regime of partial market coverage. The two models are solved to show the emergence of a unique saddle-point steady-state equilibrium in both cases. Then, equi...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Spatial economics ; Volume 1: Theory |
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| 1. Verfasser: | |
| Pages: | 1 |
| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
2020
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| Schlagworte: | |
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | A dynamic Hotelling monopoly model is proposed, with the purpose of characterising the effects of informative and persuasive advertising in a regime of partial market coverage. The two models are solved to show the emergence of a unique saddle-point steady-state equilibrium in both cases. Then, equilibrium profits are compared to illustrate that the firm's preferences on the type of advertising effort to be adopted strictly depend on initial conditions. |
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| ISBN: | 9783030400972 3030400972 |