Organic Unities and the Problem of Evil A Reply to Lemos

Chapter 9 constitutes a critical examination of Noah Lemos's contribution to this volume (see Chapter 8). It addresses Lemos's defense of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities against three objections. The first objection concerns what is involved in contributing to the intrinsic...

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Veröffentlicht in:Oxford studies in philosophy of religion
1. Verfasser: Zimmerman, Michael J. (VerfasserIn)
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Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: 2019
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Zusammenfassung:Chapter 9 constitutes a critical examination of Noah Lemos's contribution to this volume (see Chapter 8). It addresses Lemos's defense of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities against three objections. The first objection concerns what is involved in contributing to the intrinsic value of a state of affairs; the second concerns a kind of evaluative schizophrenia; and the third concerns the concept of evaluative inadequacy. Lemos's response to the third objection is examined at length, and it is argued that this response may not succeed in defeating the objection, in which case the problem of evil may not be as easy to solve as some theodicists have suggested