Policy-making in nested institutions explaining the conservation failure of the EU's common fisheries policy

The widely recognised conservation failure of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is largely due to the nested institutional context in which fishermen's issues are negotiated. Divergent Member State interests regarding the competence of Community institutions have led to the selection and mainte...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of common market studies
1. Verfasser: Payne, Dexter C. (VerfasserIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: 2000
Schlagworte:
Europäische Union > EU-Fischereipolitik > EU-Staaten > Fischereipolitik > Interessenkonflikt > Internationale Organisation > Politik > Fischerei > Fische > Vorkommen > Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
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Zusammenfassung:The widely recognised conservation failure of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) is largely due to the nested institutional context in which fishermen's issues are negotiated. Divergent Member State interests regarding the competence of Community institutions have led to the selection and maintenance of ineffective policies. I propose a three-level game to draw out the implications of policy-making within nested institutions. To substantiate this explanation, I show how the guiding principles of the CFP have created and heightened Prisoner's Dilemma game incentives among both Member States and fishermen, yet have been retained due to divergent Member State interests. (Journal of Common Market Studies / FUB)
Beschreibung:In: Journal of common market studies
Beschreibung:Graph. Darst
ISSN:0021-9886