A model of welfare competition with evidence from AFDC

In this paper, we test empirically for strategic behaviour among the states using the cash support program Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC). To motivate the empirical work, we adept Wildasinś [41] model of income redistribution to a model of "interjurisdictional welfare competitio...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Saavedra, Luz Amparo (VerfasserIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: Mannheim ZEW 1999
Schriftenreihe:Discussion paper 99,27 : Public finance and corporate taxation
Schlagworte:
1985-1995 > Öffentliche Sozialleistungen > Familienleistungsausgleich > Familienpolitik > Institutioneller Wettbewerb > Binnenwanderung > Schätzung > USA > Fiskalpolitik > Einkommensumverteilung > Wohlfahrt > Sozialausgaben > Vermeidung > Wettbewerb
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this paper, we test empirically for strategic behaviour among the states using the cash support program Aid to Families with Dependant Children (AFDC). To motivate the empirical work, we adept Wildasinś [41] model of income redistribution to a model of "interjurisdictional welfare competition." Although welfare competition may be generated from different frameworks, we choose Wildasinś model to illustrate how welfare benefit interdependence is generated in the context of welfare migration. We estimate a "representative reaction function" for AFDC using both cross-sections and pooled cross-sections data. After controlling for other determinants of AFDC benefit levels and for spatial error autocorrelation, we find evidence showing competition.
Beschreibung:Literaturverz. S. 32 - 34
AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Auch im Internet unter der Adresse ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp2799.pdf verfügbar
Beschreibung:38 S.