Necessary existence

"Necessary Existence' breaks ground on one of the deepest questions anyone ever asks: why is there anything? The classic answer is in terms of a necessary foundation. Yet, why think that is the correct answer? Pruss and Rasmussen present an original defense of the hypothesis that there is...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. Verfasser: Pruss, Alexander R. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser: Rasmussen, Joshua L. (VerfasserIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: Oxford, UK Oxford University Press 2018
Ausgabe:First edition
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Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:"Necessary Existence' breaks ground on one of the deepest questions anyone ever asks: why is there anything? The classic answer is in terms of a necessary foundation. Yet, why think that is the correct answer? Pruss and Rasmussen present an original defense of the hypothesis that there is a concrete necessary being capable of providing a foundation for the existence of things. They offer six main arguments, divided into six chapters. The first argument is an up-to-date presentation and assessment of a traditional causal-based argument from contingency. The next five arguments are new "possibility-based" arguments that make use of twentieth-century advances in modal logic. The arguments present possible pathways to an intriguing and far-reaching conclusion. The final chapter answers the most challenging objections to the existence of necessary things."--
Introduction -- Metaphysical possibility and necessity -- An argument from contingency -- An argument from possible causes -- From possible causes II -- From modal uniformity -- From necessary abstracts to necessary concreta -- The argument from percetions -- Arguments from a ncessary being
Beschreibung:Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke
Includes bibliographical references (pages 209-215) and index
Beschreibung:viii, 223 pages
illustrations
ISBN:9780198746898
978-0-19-874689-8
019874689X
0-19-874689-X