Bridging the gap how conceptual change can remove the obstacles to a scientific explanation of consciousness
Dissertation, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2019
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin
Schwabe Verlag
2020
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| Schriftenreihe: | Theoria
1 |
| Schlagworte: |
physicalism
> Type C materialism
> scientific explanations
> explanatory gap
> phenomenal concepts
> conceptual change
> hard problem of consciousness
> functionalism
> conceptual analysis
> consciousness
> philosophy of mind
> Hochschulschrift
> Bewusstsein
> Philosophy of Mind
> Leib-Seele-Problem
> Physikalismus
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | Dissertation, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, 2019 Can consciousness be scientifically explained? While scientific knowledge of the brain is still lacking in many ways, philosophers like Joseph Levine and David Chalmers have already argued that such an explanation is impossible. The book addresses this widely discussed argument from a new angle: It starts from the fact that the arguments for the so called “explanatory gap” rely crucially on our current concept of consciousness. The present work therefore looks at the possibility of conceptual change as a way to remove the obstacles to a scientific explanation of consciousness. It presents a possible development of our concept of consciousness which would allow for an explanation and shows that the arguments for the gap can therefore be refuted. |
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| Beschreibung: | 286 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9783757400378 |