Every symmetric 3 x 3 global game of strategic complementarities is noise independent
We prove that the global game selection in all 3 x 3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games is independent of the noise structure. As far as we know, all other proofs of noise independence of such games rely on the existence of a so-called monotone potential (MP) maximiser. Our result is more general,...
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Berlin
SFB 649, Economic Risk
2010
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| Schriftenreihe: | SFB 649 discussion paper
2010,061 |
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| Online Zugang: | http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2010-061.pdf |
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | We prove that the global game selection in all 3 x 3 payoff-symmetric supermodular games is independent of the noise structure. As far as we know, all other proofs of noise independence of such games rely on the existence of a so-called monotone potential (MP) maximiser. Our result is more general, since some 3 x 3 symmetric supermodular games do not admit an MP maximiser. Moreover, a corollary is that noise independence does not imply the existence of an MP maximiser. -- Global games, noise independence |
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| Beschreibung: | 8 S. : graph. Darst. |
| Format: | Acrobat Reader |