Austin's way with skepticism an essay on philosophical method
Cover; Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; 1: Austin's Critical Method; I A Skeptical Argument; II Some Remarks about the Pretensions and Workings of the Argument; III Austin's Way with the Argument; IV The Consensu...
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford, United Kingdom
Oxford University Press
2018
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| Ausgabe: | First edition |
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | Cover; Austin's Way with Skepticism: An Essay on Philosophical Method; Copyright; Dedication; Preface; Contents; 1: Austin's Critical Method; I A Skeptical Argument; II Some Remarks about the Pretensions and Workings of the Argument; III Austin's Way with the Argument; IV The Consensus: Austin's Appeal to Ordinary Practice is Misguided; V Austin Misread; VI Austin's Actual Brief; VII The Nature of the Evidence to which Austin Appeals; VIII The "Snag of Divergent Usage"; IX The Problem of Pragmatics; X The Appeal to Philosophical Detachment; XI The Appeal to Intuitions XII Two Kinds of Freedom to TheorizeXIII The Work Left to Do; 2: Austin as Theorist; I The Mistake of Thinking of Austin as an Anti-Philosopher; II Austin on the Nature of Knowledge; III If You Know, You Can't Be Wrong; IV The Four Worries about Austin's Account of Knowledge; V Special Reasons; VI The Charge of Over-Intellectualization; VII The Missing "in Virtue" Account; VIII The Argument from Ignorance; 3: Philosophical Detachment Revisited; I Looking for a Route between the Horns; II The Plane-Spotters; III Understanding Human Knowledge in General; IV The Nature of Experience V Explaining How It's Possible for You to Know Anything about a SubjectVI The Tug of the Dream Argument; VII Pragmatics Revisited; VIII A More Ecumenical Attempt; IX The Challenge that Remains; 4: How to Do Things with Austin: The Lottery and the Preface; I The Requirement of Deductive Cogency; II The Confidence Threshold Requirement; III Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part I; IV Why the Threshold Requirement Can't Be Correct, Part II; V Two Senses of "Believe": The Lottery Paradox Dissolved; VI The Preface: Saying It's All True; VII The Preface: A Matter of Modesty VIII The Preface: Saying the ImprobableIX A Worry about Downstream Consequences; X The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part I; XI The Worry about Downstream Consequences Addressed, Part II; XII Coming to Terms with Our Human Fallibility; 5: How to Do Things with Austin: Gettier's Challenge; I Is it Important to Decide What You Know?; II Knowledge and Evidence; III Justified Belief and Evidence; IV Why Justified Belief Isn't Evidence; V Why Justified True Belief Isn't Evidence; VI The Methodological Import of Gettier's Case VII A Case that hasn't the Methodological Import of Gettier'sVIII A Moral about Experimental Epistemology; IX Moral Reinforced: The Pragmatic Encroachment Thesis; 6: Epistemology Austin's Way; Appendix: A Brief Exercise in Product Differentiation; Bibliography; Index In 'Austin's Way with Skepticism', Mark Kaplan argues that J. L Austin's 'ordinary language' approach to epistemological problems has been misread. Contrary to the consensus view, Kaplan presents Austin's methods as both a powerful critique of the project of constructive epistemology and an appreciation of how epistemology needs to be done |
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| Beschreibung: | xii, 179 Seiten |
| ISBN: | 9780198824855 978-0-19-882485-5 |