Elites, institutions and the quality of government
"Elite politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen hold the fortunes of societies in their hands not only because of their direct influence on politics, administration and economy but also since their behavior indirectly signals how things are done. How are elites persuaded not to use their privil...
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| Weitere Verfasser: | , |
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Basingstoke u.a.
Palgrave Macmillan
2015
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| Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
| Schriftenreihe: | The executive politics and governance series
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| Schlagworte: |
Elite (Social sciences) / Political activity
> Power (Social sciences)
> Political corruption
> POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Political Parties
> POLITICAL SCIENCE / Constitutions
> POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Leadership
> POLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / General
> Führung
> Politische Institution
> Partei
> Gesellschaft
> Politik
> Elite
> Korruption
> Aufsatzsammlung
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| Online Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | "Elite politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen hold the fortunes of societies in their hands not only because of their direct influence on politics, administration and economy but also since their behavior indirectly signals how things are done. How are elites persuaded not to use their privileged position to enrich themselves at the expense of the society at large? The answer from research, so far, is through formal and informal institutional constraints, which in different ways alter incentives at the top. This edited volume contributes to the knowledge of the interaction between elites, institutions and other constraints and how this affects corruption and other forms of bad government. It problematizes the incentives for elites and masses to fight grand and petty corruption, respectively, and demonstrates the importance of elite constraints for good societies, where infant mortality is low and life expectancy and satisfaction are high. It also explores the behavior of a largely unconstrained elite group, namely the diplomatic corps, and shows how corruption not only takes the form of money transfers but also of sexual exploitation. It reveals how even rather distant historical experiences incite elites to behave either in line with their immediate self-interests or with the interest of the society at large. Taking a step further, it considers different ways in which elites' preferences are more closely aligned with the general interest when, for example, monitoring mechanisms are introduced through interactions between recruitment regimes to the bureaucracy, or economic motivations and democratic accountability. Finally, it explores how political parties can be a positive force in the fight against corruption and bad government"-- |
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| Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references Machine generated contents note: -- List of illustrations -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- PART I: INTRODUCTION -- 1. How institutions constrain elites from destructive behavior; Carl Dahlstrom and Lena Wangnerud -- 2. Good Societies Need Good Leaders on a Leash; Soren Holmberg and Bo Rothstein -- 3. Are Corrupt Elites Necessary for Corrupt Countries?; Susan Rose-Ackerman -- 4. Prestige, Immunity and Diplomats: Understanding Sexual Corruption; Ann Towns -- PART II: HISTORY AND STATE-BUILDING -- 5. The Political and Historical Origins of Good Government: How Social Contracts Shape Elite Behavior; Anna Persson and Martin Sjostedt -- 6. Political Leadership and Quality of Government: Restraining Elites at Nascent Statehood; Ulrika Muller and Isabell Schierenbeck -- 7. Rulers and their Elite Rivals: How Democratization has Increased Incentives for Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa; Michelle D'Arcy -- 8. Stability and Stagnation; Anders Sundell -- PART III: POWER-SHARING -- 9. Democratic and Professional Accountability; Carl Dahlstrom and Victor Lapuente -- 10. Property Rights without Democracy: The Role of Elites' Rotation and Asset Ownership; Leonid Polishchuk and Georgiy Syunyaev -- 11. Dynamic Economic Growth as a Constraint on Elite Behavior; Petrus Olander -- 12. Political Control of Bureaucracies as an Incentive for Party Behavior; Agnes Cornell and Marcia Grimes -- PART IV: POLITICAL PARTIES -- 13. Political Parties and the Politics of The Quality Of Government; Philip Keefer -- 14. Why Women In Encompassing Welfare States Punish Corrupt Political Parties; Helena Stensota, Lena Wangnerud and Mattias Agerberg -- 15. Anti-Corruption Parties and Good Government; Andreas Bogenholm and Nicholas Charron -- 16. Can Elections Combat Corruption? Accountability and Partisanship; Georgios Xezonakis, Spyros Kosmidis and Stefan Dahberg -- Index |
| Beschreibung: | XIX, 311 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 9781137556271 978-1-137-55627-1 1137556277 1-137-55627-7 |