Puncturing the counterinsurgency myth Britain and irregular warfare in the past, present, and future
This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficac...
Gespeichert in:
| 1. Verfasser: | |
|---|---|
| Körperschaft: | |
| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Carlisle, PA
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
2011
|
| Schriftenreihe: | Advancing strategic thought series
|
| Schlagworte: |
Geschichte 1900-2000
> Counterinsurgency / Great Britain
> Guerrilla warfare / Great Britain
> Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 20th century
> Military doctrine / Great Britain / History / 21st century
> Kriegführung
> Militärpolitik
> Sicherheitspolitik
> Geschichte
> Aufstand
> Bekämpfung
> Great Britain / Military policy
> Großbritannien
|
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | This monograph holds that an aura of mythology has surrounded conventional academic and military perceptions of British performance in the realm of irregular warfare. It identifies 10 myths regarding British counterinsurgency performance and seeks to puncture them by critically assessing the efficacy of the British way of counterinsurgency from the much-vaunted, yet over-hyped, Malayan Emergency to the withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in 2009. It challenges perceptions of the British military as an effective learning institution when it comes to irregular warfare and critically assesses traditional British counterinsurgency strategic maxims regarding hearts and minds and minimum force |
|---|---|
| Beschreibung: | "September 2011." Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-26) Introduction -- Myth #1 : the British military is an effective learning institution -- Myth #2 : British civil-military COIN planning is strategically perceptive -- Myth #3 : the British military has flexibly adapted to the demands of COIN -- Myth #4 : the British military has an ingrained educational approach to COIN -- Myth #5 : Iraq represented the zenith of 60 years worth of modern COIN learning -- Myth #6 : the British can do COIN alone -- Myth #7 : the British "don't talk to terrorists" -- Myth #8 : "hearts and minds" and "minimum force" are sacrosanct elements of the British way of COIN -- Myth #9 : the Malayan emergency is the archetypal COIN campaign -- Myth #10 : the British military are the ultimate COIN practitioners -- The value of the British experience |
| Beschreibung: | VII, 26 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 1584875097 9781584875093 978-1-58487-509-3 |