Decisionmaking in Operation Iraqi Freedom the strategic shift of 2007
In this second volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible, perhaps probable, strategic success. Although numerous strat...
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Carlisle, PA
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College
2010
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| Schriftenreihe: | Operation Iraqi Freedom key decisions monograph series
2 |
| Schlagworte: |
Bush, George W. / (George Walker) / 1946- / Military leadership
> Geschichte 2007
> Iraq War, 2003- / Decision making
> Counterinsurgency / Iraq
> Civil-military relations / Iraq
> Strategy
> DIME (Diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) elements
> Elements of national power
> Golfkrieg
> Entscheidungsprozess
> Strategie
> United States / Military policy
> Irak
> USA
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | In this second volume of the series, Dr. Metz looks carefully at the 2007 decision to surge forces into Iraq, a choice which is generally considered to have been effective in turning the tide of the war from potential disaster to possible, perhaps probable, strategic success. Although numerous strategic decisions remain to be made as the U.S. military executes its "responsible withdrawal" from Iraq, Dr. Metz has encapsulated much of the entire war in these two monographs, describing both the start and what may eventually be seen as the beginning of the end of the war. In this volume, he provides readers with an explanation of how a decision process that was fundamentally unchanged, with essentially the same people shaping and making the decision, could produce such a different result in 2007. As the current administration tries to replicate the surge in Afghanistan, this monograph shows the perils of attempting to achieve success in one strategic situation by copying actions successfully taken in another, but where different conditions applied.-- |
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| Beschreibung: | "May 2010." Includes bibliographical references (p. 64-78) Introduction -- The decision. Political and strategic context -- Decisionmakers -- The process -- Decision shapers -- Decision criteria and dynamics -- Options considered -- Analysis -- Implications -- Recommendations -- Conclusion |
| Beschreibung: | XIV, 78 S. Ill. |
| ISBN: | 9781584874416 978-1-58487-441-6 1584874414 1-58487-441-4 |