Logical pluralism
"In this book J. C. Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what they call logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, they argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic,...
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Format: | UnknownFormat |
Sprache: | eng |
Veröffentlicht: |
Oxford u.a.
Clarendon Press
2006
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Ausgabe: | 1. publ. |
Schlagworte: | |
Online Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis Klappentext |
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Zusammenfassung: | "In this book J. C. Beall and Greg Restall present and defend what they call logical pluralism, arguing that the notion of logical consequence doesn't pin down one deductive consequence relation; it allows for many of them. In particular, they argue that broadly classical, intuitionistic, and relevant accounts of deductive logic are genuine logical consequence relations; we should not search for one true logic, since there are many. Their conclusions have profound implications for many linguists as well as for philosophers."--BOOK JACKET. |
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Beschreibung: | Hier auch später erschienene, unveränderte Nachdrucke |
Beschreibung: | VIII, 143 S. |
ISBN: | 9780199288403 978-0-19-928840-3 9780199288410 978-0-19-928841-0 0199288402 0-19-928840-2 0199288410 0-19-928841-0 |