Repeated games with incomplete information
During the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler, and Richard Stearns collaborated on research on the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected here for the firs...
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| Format: | UnknownFormat |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge, Mass. u.a.
MIT Press
1995
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| Schlagworte: |
Armements - Contrôle - Simulation, Méthodes de
> Desarme - Simulación - Métodos
> Désarmement - Simulation, Méthodes de
> Jeux, Théorie des
> Juegos, Teoría de los
> Ontwapening
> Speltheorie
> Wapenbeheersing
> Arms control
> Simulation methods
> Disarmament
> Game theory
> Rüstungsbegrenzung
> Spieltheorie
> Abrüstung
> Unvollkommene Information
> Simulation
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Tag hinzufügen | Zusammenfassung: | During the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler, and Richard Stearns collaborated on research on the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected here for the first time, with the addition of "postscripts" describing many of the developments since the papers were written. The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others. |
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| Beschreibung: | XVII, 342 S. graph. Darst. |
| ISBN: | 0262011476 0-262-01147-6 |