Procurement design with corruption

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:American economic journal. Microeconomics
1. Verfasser: Burguet, Roberto (VerfasserIn)
Format: UnknownFormat
Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: May 2017
Schlagworte:
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Titel Jahr Verfasser
Searching for service 2020 Janssen, Maarten C. W.
Digitizing disclosure : the case of restaurant hygiene scores 2020 Dai, Weijia
Revealed preference analysis with normal goods : application to cost-of-living indices 2020 Cherchye, Laurens
Demand volatility, adjustment costs, and productivity : an examination of capacity utilization in hotels and airlines 2020 Butters, R. Andrew
Biased-belief equilibrium 2020 Heller, Yuval
History-bound reelections 2020 Gersbach, Hans
Market panics, frenzies, and informational efficiency : theory and experiment 2020 Kendall, Chad
The importance of commitment power in games with imperfect evidence 2020 Silva, Francisco
Hybrid all-pay and winner-pay contests 2020 Lagerlöf, Johan
Informational cycles in search markets 2020 Mauring, Eeva
Mutually consistent revealed preference demand predictions 2020 Adams, Abi
Within-industry specialization and global market power 2020 Lashkaripour, Ahmad
Promotion signaling and human capital investments 2020 Waldman, Michael
Regulatory competition and the market for corporate law 2020 Eldar, Ofer
Competition, product proliferation, and welfare : a study of the us smartphone market 2020 Fan, Ying
Revealed preference implications of backward induction and subgame perfection 2020 Schenone, Pablo
Image versus information : changing societal norms and optimal privacy 2020 Ali, S. Nageeb
Imitation perfection : a simple rule to prevent discrimination in procurement 2020 Mass, Helene
Voting and contributing when the group is watching 2020 Henry, Emeric
Information transmission under the shadow of the future : an experiment 2020 Wilson, Alistair J.
Alle Artikel auflisten