| Biased-belief equilibrium
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2020 |
Heller, Yuval |
| History-bound reelections
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2020 |
Gersbach, Hans |
| Market panics, frenzies, and informational efficiency : theory and experiment
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2020 |
Kendall, Chad |
| The importance of commitment power in games with imperfect evidence
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2020 |
Silva, Francisco |
| Hybrid all-pay and winner-pay contests
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2020 |
Lagerlöf, Johan |
| Informational cycles in search markets
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2020 |
Mauring, Eeva |
| Mutually consistent revealed preference demand predictions
|
2020 |
Adams, Abi |
| Within-industry specialization and global market power
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2020 |
Lashkaripour, Ahmad |
| Promotion signaling and human capital investments
|
2020 |
Waldman, Michael |
| Searching for service
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2020 |
Janssen, Maarten C. W. |
| Digitizing disclosure : the case of restaurant hygiene scores
|
2020 |
Dai, Weijia |
| Revealed preference analysis with normal goods : application to cost-of-living indices
|
2020 |
Cherchye, Laurens |
| Demand volatility, adjustment costs, and productivity : an examination of capacity utilization in hotels and airlines
|
2020 |
Butters, R. Andrew |
| Experimenting with career concerns
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2020 |
Halac, Marina |
| Incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players
|
2020 |
Hanany, Eran |
| Job insecurity
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2020 |
Kuvalekar, Aditya |
| The economics of crowdfunding
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2020 |
Chang, Jen-Wen |
| Pricing network effects : competition
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2020 |
Fainmesser, Itay |
| Optimal collateralized contracts
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2020 |
Cao, Dan Vu |
| Designing dynamic research contests
|
2020 |
Benkert, Jean-Michel |
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