How can central banks deliver credible commitment and be "emergency institutions"?

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Conference on Central Bank Governance and Oversight Reform (2015 : Stanford, Calif.) Central bank governance and oversight reform
1. Verfasser:	Tucker, Paul (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2016
Schlagworte:	Zentralbank > Geldpolitik > Taylor-Regel > Lender of Last Resort > Aufsatz im Buch
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Titel	Jahr	Verfasser
[Rezension von: Central bank governance and oversight reform]	2017	Kirsanova, Tatiana
Policy rule legislation in practice	2016	Papell, David H.
How can central banks deliver credible commitment and be "emergency institutions"?	2016	Tucker, Paul
Institutional design : deliberations, decisions, and committee dynamics	2016	Warsh, Kevin M.
Some historical reflections on the governance of the Federal Reserve	2016	Bordo, Michael D.
Panel on independence, accountability, and transparency in central bank governance	2016	Plosser, Charles I.
Goals versus rules as central bank performance measures	2016	Walsh, Carl E.