Incentivized development in China leaders, governance, and growth in China's counties
Machine generated contents note: List of tables; List of figures; Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. Understanding China's county-level economic growth; 3. Governance for growth: investment attraction and institutional development; 4. First in command: leadership roles for county development...
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Format: | UnknownFormat |
Sprache: | eng |
Veröffentlicht: |
New York, NY
Cambridge University Press
2016
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Schlagworte: |
Regionales Wachstum
> Räumliche Verteilung
> Institutionenökonomik
> Regionalpolitik
> Governance-Ansatz
> Vergleich
> China
> Regional economics
> Provincial governments
> Central-local government relations
> Economic development
> POLITICAL SCIENCE
> Government
> Economic history
> Regional disparities
> Economic conditions
> Wirtschaftspolitik
> Governance
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Zusammenfassung: | Machine generated contents note: List of tables; List of figures; Acknowledgements; 1. Introduction; 2. Understanding China's county-level economic growth; 3. Governance for growth: investment attraction and institutional development; 4. First in command: leadership roles for county development; 5. Paths to promotion: the inconsistent importance of economic performance; 6. Ignoring growth: the institutional and economic costs of maintaining stability; 7. Conclusion: a new political economy of uneven regional development; Appendix 1; Appendix 2; Index; Bibliography "China's economy, as a whole, has developed rapidly over the past 35 years, and yet its richest county is over 100 times richer in per capita terms than its poorest county. To explain this vast variation in development, David J. Bulman investigates the political foundations of local economic growth in China, focusing on the institutional and economic roles of county-level leaders and the career incentives that shape their behaviour. Through a close examination of six counties complemented by unique nation-wide data, he presents and explores two related questions: what is the role of County Party Secretaries in determining local governance and growth outcomes? And why do County Party Secretaries emphasize particular developmental priorities? Suitable for scholars of political economy, development economics, and comparative politics, this original study analyzes the relationship between political institutions, local governance, and leadership roles within Chinese government to explain the growing divergence in economic development between counties"-- |
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Beschreibung: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 239-266) and index |
Beschreibung: | xiii, 270 Seiten Illustrationen, Diagramme, Karten 24 cm |
ISBN: | 9781107166295 978-1-107-16629-5 1107166292 1-107-16629-2 |