Central bank governance and oversight reform
"In Central Bank Governance and Oversight Reform, the distinguished contributors tackle this and a range of other key questions surrounding the balance of central bank authority with accountability and constraints. They discuss the conflicting public attitudes towards the Fed. The authors evalu...
Gespeichert in:
Körperschaften: | , |
---|---|
Weitere Verfasser: | , , , , , , , , , , , |
Format: | UnknownFormat |
Sprache: | eng |
Veröffentlicht: |
Stanford, California
Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University
2016
|
Schriftenreihe: | Hoover Institution Press publication
no. 666 |
Schlagworte: | |
Online Zugang: | Inhaltsverzeichnis |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Titel | Jahr | Verfasser |
---|---|---|
[Rezension von: Central bank governance and oversight reform] | 2017 | Kirsanova, Tatiana |
Policy rule legislation in practice | 2016 | Papell, David H. |
How can central banks deliver credible commitment and be "emergency institutions"? | 2016 | Tucker, Paul |
Institutional design : deliberations, decisions, and committee dynamics | 2016 | Warsh, Kevin M. |
Some historical reflections on the governance of the Federal Reserve | 2016 | Bordo, Michael D. |
Panel on independence, accountability, and transparency in central bank governance | 2016 | Plosser, Charles I. |
Goals versus rules as central bank performance measures | 2016 | Walsh, Carl E. |