| A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
|
2017 |
Kirkegaard, René |
| Dynamic contracting : an irrelevance theorem
|
2017 |
Eső, Péter |
| Repeated Nash implementation
|
2017 |
Mezzetti, Claudio |
| General revealed preference theory
|
2017 |
Chambers, Christopher P. |
| On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games
|
2017 |
Khan, Mohammed Ali |
| A theory of political gridlock
|
2017 |
Ortner, Juan |
| One dimensional mechanism design
|
2017 |
Moulin, Hervé |
| Rationally inattentive preferences and hidden information costs
|
2017 |
Oliveira, Henrique de |
| Social distance and network structures
|
2017 |
Iijima, Ryota |
| Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
|
2017 |
Sugaya, Takuo |
| Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
|
2017 |
Fragiadakis, Daniel |
| Magical thinking : a representation result
|
2017 |
Daley, Brendan |
| Equilibria in symmetric games : theory and applications
|
2017 |
Hefti, Andreas |
| Bayesian games with a continuum of states
|
2017 |
Hellman, Ziv |
| Capital-labor substitution, structural change, and growth
|
2017 |
Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco |
| Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry
|
2017 |
Ye, Lixin |
| Directives, expressives, and motivation
|
2017 |
Suzuki, Toru |
| Sequential voting and agenda manipulation
|
2017 |
Barberà, Salvador |
| Competing with asking prices
|
2017 |
Lester, Benjamin |
| Modeling infinitely many agents
|
2017 |
He, Wei |
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