| Auction design without quasilinear preferences
|
2017 |
Baisa, Brian |
| On the existence of approximate equilibria and sharing rule solutions in discontinuous games
|
2017 |
Bich, Philippe |
| How do you defend a network?
|
2017 |
Dziubiński, Marcin |
| Job security, stability, and production efficiency
|
2017 |
Fu, Hu |
| Career concerns with exponential learning
|
2017 |
Bonatti, Alessandro |
| Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection
|
2017 |
Barron, Daniel |
| Preventing bank runs
|
2017 |
Andolfatto, David |
| Choice overload and asymmetric regret
|
2017 |
Buturak, Gökhan |
| Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance
|
2017 |
Luz, Vitor Farinha |
| A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
|
2017 |
Kirkegaard, René |
| Dynamic contracting : an irrelevance theorem
|
2017 |
Eső, Péter |
| Repeated Nash implementation
|
2017 |
Mezzetti, Claudio |
| General revealed preference theory
|
2017 |
Chambers, Christopher P. |
| On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games
|
2017 |
Khan, Mohammed Ali |
| A theory of political gridlock
|
2017 |
Ortner, Juan |
| One dimensional mechanism design
|
2017 |
Moulin, Hervé |
| Rationally inattentive preferences and hidden information costs
|
2017 |
Oliveira, Henrique de |
| Social distance and network structures
|
2017 |
Iijima, Ryota |
| Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
|
2017 |
Sugaya, Takuo |
| Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
|
2017 |
Fragiadakis, Daniel |
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