Information disclosure in auctions an experiment

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	The handbook of market design
1. Verfasser:	Dufwenberg, Martin (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Genîzî, Ûrî (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2013
Schlagworte:	Auktion > Auskunftspflicht > Informationsverhalten > Experiment > Aufsatz im Buch
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