Optimal incentives in core-selecting auctions

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	The handbook of market design
1. Verfasser:	Day, Robert W. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Milgrom, Paul (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2013
Schlagworte:	Telekommunikationssektor > Internet-Auktion > Auktionstheorie > Großbritannien > Aufsatz im Buch
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

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