Flexible contracts

This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract so as...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Gottardi, Piero (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Tallon, Jean-Marc (VerfasserIn), Ghirardato, Paolo (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies 2010
Schriftenreihe:	CESifo working paper series Empirical and theoretical methods 2927
Schlagworte:
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