Characterization of strategy-proof, revenue monotone combinatorial auction mechanisms and connection with false-name-Proofness

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Internet and network economics
1. Verfasser:	Todo, Taiki (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Iwasaki, Atsushi (VerfasserIn), Yokoo, Makoto (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2009
Schlagworte:	Auktionstheorie > Scheduling-Verfahren > Theorie > Aufsatz im Buch
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