Executive compensation as an agency problem

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	The economic nature of the firm
1. Verfasser:	Bebchuk, Lucian A. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Fried, Jesse M. (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2009
Schlagworte:	Bebchuk, Lucian A. > Fried, Jesse M. > Vergütungssystem > Führungskräfte > Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie > Aufsatz im Buch
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