Agency problems and the theory of the firm

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Veröffentlicht in:The economic nature of the firm
1. Verfasser: Fama, Eugene F. (VerfasserIn)
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Sprache:eng
Veröffentlicht: 2009
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Titel Jahr Verfasser
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From the wealth of nations 2009 Smith, Adam
From risk, uncertainty and profit 2009 Knight, Frank Hyneman
Corporate govenance 2009 Zingales, Luigi
Vertical integration, appropriable rents and the competitive contracting process 2009 Klein, Benjamin
The limits of firms : incentive and bureaucratic features 2009 Williamson, Oliver E.
Understanding the employment relation : the analysis of idiosyncratic exchange 2009 Williamson, Oliver E.
The governance of contractual relations 2009 Williamson, Oliver E.
The boundaries of the firm revisited 2009 Holmström, Bengt
Contested exchange : new microfoundations for the political economy of capitalism 2009 Bowles, Samuel
Organizational forms and investment decisions 2009 Fama, Eugene F.
An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm 2009 Hart, Oliver D.
From capital 2009 Marx, Karl
The nature of the firm 2009 Coase, R. H.
Bargaining costs, influence costs and the organization of economic activity 2009 Milgrom, Paul
Production, information costs and economic organization 2009 Alchian, Armen Albert
Work motivation 2009 Bewley, Truman F.
Mergers and the market for corporate control 2009 Manne, Henry G.
Theory of the firm : managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 2009 Jensen, Michael C.
Executive compensation as an agency problem 2009 Bebchuk, Lucian A.
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