Playing with the good guys a public good game with endogenous group formation

In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable givi...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben

Weitere Verfasser:	Brekke, Kjell Arne (BerichterstatterIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a. 2009
Schriftenreihe:	CESifo working paper series Public choice 2647
Schlagworte:	Öffentliches Gut > Kooperation > Entscheidungstheorie
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