| Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
|
2017 |
Pycia, Marek |
| Allais, Ellsberg, and preferences for hedging
|
2017 |
Dean, Mark |
| Choosing on influence
|
2017 |
Cuhadaroglu, Tugce |
| Multinary group identification
|
2017 |
Cho, Wonki Jo |
| Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks
|
2017 |
Bloise, Gaetano |
| Active learning with a misspecified prior
|
2017 |
Fudenberg, Drew |
| Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
|
2017 |
Momi, Takeshi |
| Preference discovery and experimentation
|
2017 |
Cooke, Kevin |
| Double auction with interdependent values : incentives and efficiency
|
2017 |
Kojima, Fuhito |
| A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
|
2017 |
Kirkegaard, René |
| Dynamic contracting : an irrelevance theorem
|
2017 |
Eső, Péter |
| Repeated Nash implementation
|
2017 |
Mezzetti, Claudio |
| General revealed preference theory
|
2017 |
Chambers, Christopher P. |
| On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games
|
2017 |
Khan, Mohammed Ali |
| A theory of political gridlock
|
2017 |
Ortner, Juan |
| One dimensional mechanism design
|
2017 |
Moulin, Hervé |
| Rationally inattentive preferences and hidden information costs
|
2017 |
Oliveira, Henrique de |
| Social distance and network structures
|
2017 |
Iijima, Ryota |
| Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring
|
2017 |
Sugaya, Takuo |
| Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
|
2017 |
Fragiadakis, Daniel |
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