The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards theory, evidence, and policy

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Classics in corporate law and economics ; Vol. 2
1. Verfasser:	Bebchuk, Lucian A. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Coates, John C. (VerfasserIn), Subramanian, Guhan (VerfasserIn)
Pages:	2
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2008
Schlagworte:	Übernahme > Vorstand > Aktiengesellschaft > USA > Aufsatz im Buch
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Titel	Jahr	Verfasser
Mergers and the market for corporate control	2008	Manne, Henry G.
The powerful antitakeover force of staggered boards : theory, evidence, and policy	2008	Bebchuk, Lucian A.
The political economy of competition for corporate charters	2008	Carney, William J.
The rise of the political model of corporate governance and corporate control	2008	Pound, John
A political theory of American corporate finance	2008	Roe, Mark J.
A Coasian model of insider trading	2008	Haddock, David D.
The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers	2008	Roll, Richard
Law as a product : some pieces of the incorporation puzzle	2008	Romano, Roberta
Corporate crime legislation : a political economy analysis	2008	Khanna, Vikramaditya S.
The proper role of a target's management in responding to a tender offer	2008	Easterbrook, Frank H.
A theoretical analysis of corporate greenmail	2008	Macey, Jonathan R.
State law, shareholder protection, and the theory of the corporation	2008	Winter, Ralph K.
The regulation of insider trading	2008	Carlton, Dennis W.
Regulation on demand : a private interest model, with an application to insider trading regulation	2008	Haddock, David D.
Seeking competitive bids versus pure passivity in tender offer defense	2008	Gilson, Ronald J.
Toward an interest-group theory of Delaware corporate law	2008	Macey, Jonathan R.