Games solutions and the normal form

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Veröffentlicht in:Knowledge, belief, and strategic interaction
1. Verfasser: Harsanyi, John C. (VerfasserIn)
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Veröffentlicht: 1992
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Titel Jahr Verfasser
[Rezension von: Knowledge, belief and strategic interaction, ed. by Cristina Bicchieri ..] 1993 Janssen, Maarten C. W.
Rational choice in the context of ideal games 1992 McClennen, Edward F.
Tortuous labyrinth : noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players 1992 Rabinowicz, Wlodzimierz
Algorithmic knowledge and game theory 1992 Binmore, Ken
The logic of Ulam's games with lies 1992 Mundici, Daniele
The electronic mail game : strategic behavior under "almost common knowledge" 1992 Rubinstein, Ariel
Knowledge-dependent games : backward induction 1992 Bicchieri, Cristina
Hyperrational games : concepts and resolutions 1992 Sobel, Jordan Howard
Semantical aspects of quantified modal logic 1992 Corsi, Giovanni
Abstract notions of simultaneous equilibrium and their uses 1992 Ferrante, Vittorioemanuele
Common knowledge and games with perfect information 1992 Reny, Philip J.
Counterfactuals and a theory of equilibrium in games 1992 Shin, Hyun Song
Feasibility 1992 Levi, Isaac
Epistemic logic and game theory 1992 Walliser, Bernard
The acquisition of common knowledge 1992 Bacharach, Michael
Elicitation for games 1992 Kadane, Joseph B.
Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions 1992 Kadane, Joseph B.
Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation 1992 Skyrms, Brian
On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation 1992 Vannucci, Stefano
Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators 1992 Dalla Chiara, Maria Luisa
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