The electronic mail game strategic behavior under "almost common knowledge"

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Knowledge, belief, and strategic interaction
1. Verfasser:	Rubinstein, Ariel (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Veröffentlicht:	1992
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Titel	Jahr	Verfasser
[Rezension von: Knowledge, belief and strategic interaction, ed. by Cristina Bicchieri ..]	1993	Janssen, Maarten C. W.
Feasibility	1992	Levi, Isaac
Epistemic logic and game theory	1992	Walliser, Bernard
The acquisition of common knowledge	1992	Bacharach, Michael
Elicitation for games	1992	Kadane, Joseph B.
Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions	1992	Kadane, Joseph B.
Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation	1992	Skyrms, Brian
On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation	1992	Vannucci, Stefano
Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators	1992	Dalla Chiara, Maria Luisa
Representing facts	1992	Segerberg, Krister
Introduction to metamoral	1992	Magari, Roberto
Games solutions and the normal form	1992	Harsanyi, John C.
The dynamics of belief systems : foundations versus coherence theories	1992	Gärdenfors, Peter
Rational choice in the context of ideal games	1992	McClennen, Edward F.
Tortuous labyrinth : noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players	1992	Rabinowicz, Wlodzimierz
Algorithmic knowledge and game theory	1992	Binmore, Ken
The logic of Ulam's games with lies	1992	Mundici, Daniele
The electronic mail game : strategic behavior under "almost common knowledge"	1992	Rubinstein, Ariel
Knowledge-dependent games : backward induction	1992	Bicchieri, Cristina
Hyperrational games : concepts and resolutions	1992	Sobel, Jordan Howard