[Rezension von: Knowledge, belief and strategic interaction, ed. by Cristina Bicchieri ..]
|
1993 |
Janssen, Maarten C. W. |
Elicitation for games
|
1992 |
Kadane, Joseph B. |
Equilibrium, common knowledge, and optimal sequential decisions
|
1992 |
Kadane, Joseph B. |
Equilibria and the dynamics of rational deliberation
|
1992 |
Skyrms, Brian |
On consistency properties of some strongly implementable social choice rules with endogenous agenda formation
|
1992 |
Vannucci, Stefano |
Possible worlds, counterfactuals, and epistemic operators
|
1992 |
Dalla Chiara, Maria Luisa |
Representing facts
|
1992 |
Segerberg, Krister |
Introduction to metamoral
|
1992 |
Magari, Roberto |
Games solutions and the normal form
|
1992 |
Harsanyi, John C. |
The dynamics of belief systems : foundations versus coherence theories
|
1992 |
Gärdenfors, Peter |
Rational choice in the context of ideal games
|
1992 |
McClennen, Edward F. |
Tortuous labyrinth : noncooperative normal-form games between hyperrational players
|
1992 |
Rabinowicz, Wlodzimierz |
Algorithmic knowledge and game theory
|
1992 |
Binmore, Ken |
The logic of Ulam's games with lies
|
1992 |
Mundici, Daniele |
The electronic mail game : strategic behavior under "almost common knowledge"
|
1992 |
Rubinstein, Ariel |
Knowledge-dependent games : backward induction
|
1992 |
Bicchieri, Cristina |
Feasibility
|
1992 |
Levi, Isaac |
Epistemic logic and game theory
|
1992 |
Walliser, Bernard |
The acquisition of common knowledge
|
1992 |
Bacharach, Michael |
Hyperrational games : concepts and resolutions
|
1992 |
Sobel, Jordan Howard |