Tax overpayments, tax evasion, and book-tax differences

A strictly risk-averse manager makes joint decisions on a firm's tax payments and book profit declarations according to accounting standards. It is analysed how the incentives to overpay or evade taxes and to inflate book profits are influenced by (1) the composition of the manager's remun...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Bibliographische Detailangaben

1. Verfasser:	Goerke, Laszlo (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	Munich Univ., Center for Economic Studies u.a. 2008
Schriftenreihe:	CESifo working paper series Public finance 2212
Schlagworte:	Steuerhinterziehung > Politische Kontrolle
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