Rational choice politics and political institutions

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Democratic constitutional design and public policy
1. Verfasser:	Congleton, Roger D. (VerfasserIn)
Weitere Verfasser:	Swedenborg, Brigitta (VerfasserIn)
Format:	UnknownFormat
Sprache:	eng
Veröffentlicht:	2006
Schlagworte:	Verfassungsökonomik > Verfassung > Verfassungsreform > Neue politische Ökonomie > Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie > Theorie > Welt > Aufsatz im Buch
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Titel	Jahr	Verfasser
The effects of constitutions on coalition governments in parliamentary democracies	2006	Diermeier, Daniel
Amendment procedures and constitutional stability	2006	Rasch, Bjørn Erik
Direct democracy : designing a living constitution	2006	Frey, Bruno S.
Constitutions and prosperity : the impact of legal and economic institutions on the wealth of nations	2006	Holcombe, Randall G.
Designing constitutional stability	2006	Weingast, Barry R.
Rational choice politics and political institutions	2006	Congleton, Roger D.
Constitutions and economic policy	2006	Persson, Torsten
Party-line voting and committee assignments in the German mixed-member system	2006	Stratmann, Thomas
On the merits of bicameral legislatures : intragovernmental bargaining and policy stability	2006	Congleton, Roger D.
Federalism : a constitutional perspective	2006	Mueller, Dennis C.
Judicial independence and economic growth : some proposals regarding the judiciary	2006	Feld, Lars P.
Bicameralism and political compromise in representative democracy	2006	Bradbury, John C.
Common tax pool problems in federal systems	2006	Knight, Brian G.